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As interest in developments of artificial intelligence
(AI) models has grown, so has concern that they embed
unintended, undesirable risks and/or fail to properly
align with human values and norms. In the extreme
case, it is argued that AI may pose existential risks
to the human species. We consider entities satisfying
the Extended Church-Turing Thesis and claim these
include both human and non-quantum based AI. We then
introduce rules, including moral and ethics rules, as
linguistic entities and illustrate how they can be encoded
and treated computationally. Following Wittgenstein,
we show that rules and rule following cannot be purely
private. Whether particular rules are being followed
in specific instances depends upon ongoing engagement
with a language community. However, in situations
involving application of ethics rules there may be no
widely agreed community to use in evaluating whether
rules are being followed properly. Indeed, how are we
to determine which are appropriate ethical rules? Every
appeal to rule following itself is based upon more rules;
it is rules all the way down. Deliberative reasoning is
at the core of moral and ethics discourse and issues in
conceptualizing rule-following AIs become of particular
interest.
1. Introduction
In her entertaining book of essays [1], the playwright
Jean Kerr relates her trials raising children in the early
1950’s. In the title essay, she describes preparing for a
dinner party she was hosting by first instructing her three
young boys with a list of behavior rules including, “not
to go in the living room, not to use the guest towels in
the bathroom, and not to leave the bicycles on the front
steps.” However, when she checked the dinner table
just prior to arrival of guests she found that her floral
centerpiece was now just three stems. She had neglected
to include as a rule that her sons not to eat the daisies on
the dining-room table.
This example illustrates the broader point that we
face in behaving in a world where we frequently
encounter situations seemingly unlike any we have faced
in the past. For Kerr’s children, such a situation was the
vase of daisies on the dining room table. For a juror,
it might be deciding whether to find a person guilty of
a crime for which the death penalty was a possibility.
For a military officer, it could be determining whether
blips on a radar screen constitute early warning of a
missile attack. Ethical principles or rules may provide
guidance for behavior in such situations but, as with
Kerr’s children, they generally require not only that
the literal text of the rules be known but also that the
so-called spirit or intent of those rules be understood.
Behind literal principles will be additional rules for
determining how and when they should be applied in
any specific situation.
That ethical rules alone can be inadequate has long
been acknowledged. Kierkegaard [2] famously wrote
about Abraham hearing the voice of God instructing him
to sacrifice his son, Isaac and introduced his notion of
the teleological suspension of the ethical to account for
Abraham’s message from God taking priority over the
ethical imperative not to kill one’s child. As Schrag
[3] notes, “The ethical has here to do, in short, with
the universal (or quasi-universal) norms and principles
which are accepted by a group and set forth as proper
guides or directives for moral action.” Ethics are shared
within a community of practice; sanctioning involves
taking away community membership (e.g. losing
medical license, disbarment, or being sent to prison). Of
course, different groups of people may differ on ethical
principles and their application in particular contexts.
Consider, as examples, disagreements over abortion,
capital punishment, and even the wearing of face masks
during a public health crisis.
The public nature of ethical rules arises from their
being expressed in language.1 Examples of such rules,
1Here we invoke Wittgenstein’s argument against the existence of
a private language. This will be developed in our formal discussion of
rules in Section 2.2.





written in English, might be “Avoid being violent when
possible,” “Avoid killing human beings,” or “Wear a face
covering when around other people.” While these rules,
as do most ethical rules, take a linguistic form, it is
not the case that they can generally be assigned truth
values. Rather, they exemplify what C.S. Pierce termed
practical reasoning. In his words, they involve “What
am I prepared deliberately to accept as the statement of
what I want to do? What am I to aim at, What am I after?
To What is the force of my will to be directed?” (quoted
in [4]).
Ethics rules can help us deliberate and plan for future
behavior in as yet to be experienced situations by leaving
open bindings of key terms. When is it possible to avoid
being violent? What does it mean to be violent in a
specific situation? Is it violent to yell at someone? Is it
violent to restrain someone? Answers to such questions
will depend upon particular contexts or environments in
which we consider the rules and which additional rules
might also be invoked.
Ethics rules embedded or programmed into an AI,
if they are to emulate a key aspect of human ethical
rules, should support something like this deliberative
consideration. A central purpose in this paper is to
offer an account of rules which warrants our considering
both human and AI rules, including ethics rules, in
computational terms. We consider behaviors which are
solely rule governed as well as those which are also rule
following. It is rule following behaviors, we argue, that
pose serious challenges to aligning ethics rules among
intelligent agents.
2. Computation
As mentioned above, discourse about ethics and
values entails forms of practical reasoning about
possible courses of actions. In distinction, consider
intuitions about rule governed systems that are not
thought to also engage in practical reasoning. A rock’s
falling behavior is rule governed. Nothing about its
history will affect how it falls when dropped off a cliff.
On the other hand, some rules are normative in that they
derive from conventions or standards. Examples would
include representing numbers with arabic numerals as
opposed to Roman ones and ethics and moral rules. To
follow normative rules we must learn how to apply them
in any particular situation. With respect to such rules,
our behavior would be characterized as rule following.
A characteristic of rule following behavior is that it is
possible for a rule follower to make mistakes as they
follow rules. For example, in calculating a tip when
paying a restaurant bill, we may incorrectly compute the
percentage. Moreover, what counts as a mistake is not
a private matter; proper rule following is, as we argue
below, open to community assessment. While examples
such as those above are simple to generate, it is not
such a simple task to characterize what it is that is being
exemplified.
The first half of the 20th century saw articles
by Gödel, Turing, Post, and Church [5–8] showing
seemingly independent paths to a characterization of
what it meant to have a procedure for effectively
computing something. This characterization, the
Extended Church-Turing thesis (ECT), asserts that
anything which is computable in the physical world is
computable by a Turing machine. ECT asserts that
any process which could naturally be called an effective
procedure can be realized by a Turing machine where an
effective procedure (algorithm) is, informally, a recipe
instructing the machine, from moment to moment,
precisely how to behave. Informally, an abstract Turing
machine contains a read-write head and an infinitely
long tape divided into squares. It has the capacity to
read the content (a 1, 0, or blank) of the square under its
read-write head, write a 1 or 0 on the square under its
read-write head, to erase the content of the square under
its read-write head, and to move its read-write head one
square to the left or to the right. The formal embedding
of logic and mathematics, computability, into binary
arithmetic was accomplished independently by Gödel
and Turing [5, 6] and has had enormous implications
some of which continue to reverberate today.
From the perspective of ECT, a computation is
simply a sequence (possibly infinite) of machine
configurations. What is intriguing about this is
that seemingly independent formulations of “effective
computability” proposed by Church, Turing, and Post
[5–7] all lead to the same sort of Turing machine type of
result. Whatever is computable by a Turing machine can
also be computed by a program and is a partial recursive
function. The ECT claim then is that everything that can
be computed in the physical world can be computed by a
Turing machine. 2 Moreover, and this is the ‘extended’
part of ECT, the time it takes to compute something on
a given Turing machine will be polynomial in the time it
takes on any other. In other words, though simulating
a supercomputer on my phone may take polynomial
2We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out that since
ECT assumes that machines have discrete states it may be that
analog machines could would be able to evade limits of discrete
machines. This is an important observation. However, this seems
more a question of physics than of computation. For example, if
it is accepted that quantum mechanics undercuts viewing space-time
as being fundamentally continuous, then discrete state machines are
what is required to simulate precisely a quantum-based reality. In
any event, ECT asserts but does not prove that a Turing machine
is computationally capable of calculating anything that can exist in
the physical world. A main purpose of this paper is to provisionally
accept ECT as true and investigate its consequences for aligning and
embedding ethical rules into an AI.
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more time, at least the amount of time will not explode
exponentially. In this paper, we are interested in the
question of whether there is some natural association
between this notion of computation and the concept of
rule. Specifically, what might be significant issues in
embedding moral and ethical rules in an AI.
Here we consider whether moral and ethical rules,
as well as rules more generally, can be naturally
represented as computable procedures in the ECT sense.
If, as we argue, the answer to this is affirmative, it
then makes sense to view questions about AI ethics
and alignment from the perspective of computation.
We are assuming that ethical and moral reasoning
by humans is fundamentally computational and does
not involve some special human-only force or quality.
Our ruling out such nomological danglers should not
preclude those who disagree from being interested in the
ethics issues and challenges posed by AI we discuss in
Section 2.2. Indeed, those who hold to a non-materialist
understanding of the mind might see the concerns
we raise to be reinforcing of those their ontological
committments identify.
It is worth reiterating that the ECT formulation is
extremely general. To say, for example, that a person is
a physical realization of a Turing machine is, by itself, to
say very little. To be substantively interesting, it would
be necessary to provide details about the architecture
of the posited Turing machine. It is also important to
note that applications of this approach makes a clear
ontological claim that objects, including moral and
ethics rules, can be modeled computationally.
Our main argument is comprised of three parts. The
first, involving ECT and computation, has been outlined
above. The second, that rules, in particular ethics
and moral rules, can be represented computationally
is developed in the next Section 2.1. Our particular
formulation of this point is but one of many ways this
might be accomplished. The reader who is already
convinced, or willing to assume, that rules can be written
in computational terms is urged to go directly to Section
2.2 where we consider how this relates to questions of
algorithmic fairness and aligning human values with AI.
2.1. Rules and Computation
Consider a general rule as a procedure for doing
something. At first glance, a rule might be simple (as
in a procedure for placing a mark on a piece of paper) or
it might be quite complex (as in a rule for recognizing a
collection of marks as a poem). The intelligibility of
a rule will often be less an attribute of the rule itself
than it is of the context in which the rule is encountered.
For example, from the perspective of an English speaker
attempting to recognize marks as an “A”, the rule (or
rules) may appear trivial (just look at the marks and
decide!). Yet for AI researchers trying to understand
how it is that humans recognize characters, the rules may
appear both complex and subtle. An implication of this
latter example is that many rules may not be cognitively
accessible to the person whose behavior may be partially
determined or governed by those rules.
Our argument is straightforward.3 We first offer a
syntactic account of rule which is intended to permit
the written expression of the largest possible variety of
claims about rules. Next we define semantics for a rule
showing how to computationally evaluate a syntactically
correct rule. In discussing both syntax and semantics
will first discuss informally what we mean and then
offer a more formal definition. Formal definitions may
be skipped over without losing the central thread of
our argument. The conclusion of this argument is our
claim that a general account of rules can be expressed in
computational terms.
Rules, in particular ethics rules, while propositional
do not generally take on truth values. In this sense, one
way of envisioning a rule, R is as a relation between two
environments. If H partially describes an environment,
and C denotes a partial state of affairs in some
possible “future” environment, then R can be interpreted
as positing a relation between two environments (or
worlds). For example, an ethics rule “When shopping
in a store do not remove items without first paying for
them” expresses in ordinary language a rule that relates
an environment (shopping in a store) with a possible
state of affairs (pay for items before removing them from
the store). Informally this suggests that the application
of ethical rules in particular circumstances requires
figuring out what environment we are in and what sort
of future environment we would like to be in and then
determining which rules properly apply. Each of these
steps, we suggest, is fundamentally computational in
that it involves the, possibly recursive, application of
Turing-like computations until all relevant variables take
on concrete values (in computing language, we say these
variable are bound). So, for example, applying a rule
involving shopping in a store requires first recognizing
that our current situation does involve shopping in
a store. This recognition may itself involve many
applications of rules to get from our current visual field
to cognitive recognition that we are now in a store.
Many, maybe most, of these computations will occur
without any cognitive awareness on our part. We simply
know we are now in a store.
3The discussion of rules in Section 2.1 derives from that in [9]
which also contains a taxonomy of rule types and examples based on
our definition.
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Formally, to account for these many computations
we must identify their general form; their syntax. H and
C can be constructed from a number of h1, h2, . . . , hm
and c1, c2, . . . , cn, respectively. The elements of H and
C may be connected by logical operators or expressed
by clauses internal to the body of the rule. Thus a
general form of a rule is:
R < h1, h2, . . . , hm; c1, c2, . . . , cn¿ where the “;” is
used to separate elements of H from those of C. An
illustration in this notation is: R < h1 ∧ (h2 ∨ h3); c1 ∧
c2 >.
The elements ofH identify a partial state of affairs in
some environment. A rule is evaluated in a particular
environment. It is the function of H to indicate
the proper environment by referring to some part or
description of it either explicitly or by virtue of where
it is activated. For illustration purposes, we will make
reference to a Lisp-like denotational semantics though
later we will suggest that a reduction semantics, similar
to what we see in Mathematica, should also work.
What then are the hi and cj? From a computational
perspective, these are variables where each argument
of R could take on more than one value. Moreover,
variables can themselves be rules. Nothing in the
syntax of a rule precludes rules utilizing other rules.
A statement of the form R(R(H;C);R(H : C)) is
syntactically valid.
The syntactic form of a rule is not sufficient for
our interests. We want also to know something about
what the rule refers to; its semantics. Indeed, rules are
interesting precisely because they are often applicable
to more than a single situation. There can be distinct
values for variables in one or more environments and
our semantics must be robust enough to incorporate the
ways in which rules might be used in, among other
things, computational intelligence and ethical reasoning.
The basis for our semantics depends upon associating
or binding the variables hi to particular values in a
given environment in order to complete the conditions
necessary to executing or evaluating C by binding
values to the ci as well. If we have a form which
contains a variable, a binding for that variable permits us
to rename the variable consistently throughout the form.
Our formal discussion of evaluation derives from the
environment model of evaluation described in [10]. The
Lisp dialect Scheme is based upon such an evaluation
model. In Scheme, an environment is a sequence of
frames where each frame is a set of bindings. Moreover,
each frame (except the global frame) has a pointer to
an enclosing frame. The value of a variable relative to
an environment is determined by looking sequentially
for the first frame in the environment in which the
variable is bound. A variable is said to be unbound in an
environment when there is no binding for the variable
in any of the environment’s frames. Specification of
these details permits the instantiation of rules as we
define them and thereby connect them with effective
computability.
Values to which variables are bound are determined
by presence of an environment together with an
evaluation model as computation may be required to
identify an hi with some value or partial state of affairs
in a given environment. Binding is rule-governed and
generally the result of pattern matching algorithms. A
critic might then claim that this begs the question as we
are still left with rules. Our rejoinder is, while agreeing
that rules require rules, that our point is precisely to
demonstrate that a common sense understanding of rules
renders them equivalent to effective procedures and thus
subject to computational analysis. It’s rules all the way
down.
Specifically, the generality which characterize rules
derives from the computational processes required to
bind previously free variables. For a rule having at
least one unbound variable, its generality stems from the
number of ways in which those variables can be bound.
Rule generality is associated with (i) the definition of
the variable, (ii) the relevant environment, and (iii) the
process used to bind. This generality is important since
in ordinary language we recognize the existence of rules
which are not applicable to the present situation. A rule
against stealing does not go out of existence when there
are no objects which might be stolen in the vicinity.
While this rule may be inappropriate to one’s current
environment, it does not lose its relevance to others.
An important part of our thesis is that rules are
linguistic objects. We cannot speak of a rule absent
a formulation of it and the computations involved
in evaluating a rule will be specified by its internal
structure. Informally, we also want our conception of
rule to comport well with our ordinary understanding
of rules. We then rely on ECT to warrant that we
can, in principle, computationally rewrite rules initially
formulated in one language in another in much the same
way one computer operating system can be emulated
in another. In this manner we might hope to take
ethics rules expressed in, say English, and rewrite
them computationally in, say, Lisp. However, and
this is a central point we will develop below, using
ECT to say that we can in principle do this is quite
different from knowing whether or not we have, in fact,
accomplished it. This, we will argue, is at the center of
our understanding of the ethics AI alignment problem.
First, however, we must formally define a semantics
for representing rules computationally. We will
illustrate this continuing to use elements of the Lisp
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programming language. In interpreted Lisp, a top
level form is read and evaluated according to Lisp
evaluation procedures, and the result of the evaluation
is then printed. For example, if we feed Lisp the form
(+ 5 (+ 3 2)), our Lisp will respond by printing
the form 10.
Here both the original form and the returned form
denote the same thing—the number 10. We can
say that while the original form was reduced to the
simpler form, both (+ 5 (+ 3 2)) and 10 denote
the same object. On the other hand, consider the form
(quote (+ 3 2)).
The quote special form in Lisp is evaluated meaning
to return the form being quoted and (+ 3 2) will
be returned. Here the original form and the one
resulting from its evaluation do not denote the same
thing. The original form denotes that to which
it evaluates. This illustrates that Lisp evaluation
embodies both a reduction semantics (the first example)
and a denotational semantics (the second example).
Reduction is a replacement process where subforms of
a form are rewritten according to specified evaluation
rules. In a pure reduction semantics the process is
defined for any form so if no rewrite rule exists for
subforms of a form, then the form simply reduces to
itself. In order for Lisp procedure calls to be evaluated
any variables appearing in the call must be bound prior
to the call being made. In the rest of this discussion, we
will employ a Lisp-like syntax but assume a reduction
semantics.
Consider an informal discussion of the value of life.
The precise meaning we associate with life will depend
upon the context of the discussion; it may mean different
things in discussions of abortion policy, criminal justice,
or evolutionary theory. Similarly, the value of symbols
in Lisp will depend upon the environment in which they
are evaluated.
Our semantic notion of a rule then is:
Definition. For at least one relevant environment E
(which must be finite), a rule is a procedure of the form
R < h1, h2, . . . , hm; c1, c2, . . . , cn > such that
(i) one or more hi is initially unbound, and
(ii) one or more cj is initially unbound, and
(iii) the internal structure of R is such that an attempt
to evaluate R in E creates an attempt to locate a
binding for at least one hi.
A rule is defined both by its syntax and by
what occurs with evaluation attempts. Note that
identifying a rule with a particular procedure is not the
same as defining it as being effectively computable.
Our definition has a number of implications. First,
evaluation of a rule must invoke at least one binding rule
to attempt to locate a value (binding) for any unbound
variable. The binding rule recursively invokes itself
until it succeeds or fails. This ensures that evaluating a
rule reduces, or at least does not increase, its generality.
Further, the definition permits rules whose evaluation is
interrupted as a result of binding to particular values.
Attempting to bind at least one hi is essential for
otherwise there will be no action consequences. If
all hi were already bound, then we would have a
non-contingent formula. Such a formula could be
termed a command if the hi, if any, are already bound
or a commandment if the hi may be bound differently in
different environments. A commandment which applies
to all environments would include moral laws intended
to apply regardless of context such as “thou shall not kill
humans.” Evaluation of a rule which results in all of its
variables being bound is a formula. Significantly, rules,
including ethics rules, need not produce such definitive
results. In this sense, our conception of rule is broader
than that of a recipe. Most importantly, rules, as we
have defined them, are forms for expressing moral or
knowledge claims using variables.
2.2. Aligning Ethics Rules
Thus far we have presented the Extended
Church-Turing thesis (ECT) asserting that anything
that can be computed in the physical world can also
be computed by some Turing machine. Importantly,
Turing introduced the formal notion of a general
machine, now termed a universal Turing machine,
which can take the code of any given machine and
reproduce the behavior of that machine. A machine is
universal in that it can precisely simulate the behavior
of any other computing machine given access to that
machine’s underlying code. This is the idea that gave
rise to programmable computers. Such machines can
at one moment balance our checkbooks or maintain
our calendars and, at another, guide a spaceship to the
moon. Some computers may be faster than others, but
all are capable of doing the same thing—compute all
effective procedures or, equivalently, all partial recursive
functions. In the previous section, we offered a precise
characterization of the syntax and semantics of a rule
and suggested that our formalized definition of rules,
including ethical rules, are effectively computable.
Taken together, ECT and rules as defined here,
support the claim that, in principle, it is possible to
embed ethical rules into an AI. Much more importantly,
though, we must be concerned with what specific
combination of ethical rules are coded into a given
AI. How, for example, is an autonomous vehicle to
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weigh the implications of various possible courses of
action when a collision of some sort is calculated to be
inevitable? Or, drastically upping the stakes, what action
should an autonomous national security AI initiate when
it senses a “significant” probability that missiles are
headed its way? And, should such an AI have an
off switch permitting human override of its selected
course of action? In considering such possibilities
we presumably would like the AI rules to be in close
harmony with human rules.
Consider the following cases. First, in the
early morning of September 1, 1983 a Soviet Su-15
interceptor shot down a Korean Airlines passenger
jet heading to Seoul by way of New York City
and Anchorage. The flight, KAL 007, had veered
considerably off course and was unknowingly flying
over restricted Soviet airspace. Precisely why it was
so far off course is disputed though a critical navigation
beacon near Anchorage was offline for maintenance and
either the pilot neglected to notice this and take manual
corrective action or for some other reason the plane’s
guidance system was in the wrong mode and for five
hours the flight continued to fly far north of its planned
route. In fact, it was so far north that it exceeded
the tolerance programmed into the plane’s computer
whereby it would have reset the navigation system mode
to request a new waypoint.
Later that same month on September 26, Soviet
Air Defence Forces Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov
was duty officer for the Oko nuclear early-warning
system when the system’s computers sensed that
missiles launched from the United States were directed
toward the Soviet Union. Military protocol required
Petrov to immediately send reports of any apparent
missile launch up to his military and political superiors.
The result could well be initiation of a retaliatory strike
against the U.S. “The siren howled, but I just sat there
for a few seconds, staring at the big, back-lit, red
screen with the word ‘launch’ on it. A minute later
the siren went off again. The second missile was
launched. Then the third, and the fourth, and the fifth.
Computers changed their alerts from launch to missile
strike”, Petrov is later reported as telling the BBC [11].
Though the computer generated alert was unambiguous,
something bothered Petrov. “There were 28 or 29
security levels. After the target was identified, it had
to pass all of those ‘checkpoints’. I was not quite sure it
was possible, under those circumstances” [11]. Instead
of sending up an alert as his orders required, Petrov
decided this was most likely a system malfunction and
so reported. A possible nuclear exchange was averted.
Petrov credited his decision to his civillian education.
His colleagues, he claimed, had all been trained in
military schools to simply follow orders.
Recall that in our terminology, an order is a rule
with no unbound variables. What Petrov did was to
question the applicability of that order and do something
else. He reports not being sure he did the right thing
until about 23 minutes passed and there had been no
explosive strikes. While, given ECT, there must exist
sets of rules which could emulate Petrov’s decision to
suspend evaluation of the order rule and do something
else, how might an AI coder identify such rules? The
situation Petrov faced was extremely rare. He had
been told that the computer code reporting a launch had
multiple programmed safeguards that had to be passed
before categorizing the sensed data as a ‘strike.’ Still,
something triggered a feeling that this was more likely
a system malfunction as it did not seem reasonable to
him that all those safeguards could have been passed so
quickly and also he was not getting any launch reports
from Soviet satellite radar operators.
This examples can be seen as involving computers
and humans following (or not following) explicit rules.
One ended tragically and the other did not. While
neither example involves anything approaching an AI,
they do suggest the importance of examining what
we might expect as more decisions become largely
controlled or informed by AI-based systems. Together,
the examples illustrate an issue stemming from our
analysis. Recall that some behaviors may be rule
following. However, given our materialist ontology,
must not all behavior ultimately be rule governed in the
sense that it, at least in principle, can be accounted for
by physical laws?
Imagine we are teaching a child how to continue a
series of numbers by adding 2 to the previous number.
We illustrate what we mean by showing the sequence
0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . .. The child asks, what does . . . mean
and we respond that it means to go on in the same
way. The child lights up and says, “Oh, I see,” and
extends the sequence to 12, 14, 16, 18, 20. Then, asked
to start the series at 1000, the child responds with
1000, 1004, 1008? Our response might be “No, no; just
do what you did before.” However, suppose the child
answers that she is doing what she did before? As a
matter of fact, she says her rule was that up until 1000
the rule was to add 2 and after that to add 4 to the
previous number.
Wittgenstein [12, 13] argues that nothing in the
child’s previous answers logically excludes her having
been following a rule that adds 4 after 1000. Indeed,
an infinite number of distinct rules can be imagined
which are consistent with both 12, 14, 16, 18, 20 and
1000, 1004, 1008. It does not suffice to say that the rule
you intended to convey was an algorithm which takes
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a natural number as an input and returns a sequence
beginning with that number since an algorithm itself
is a rule, perhaps comprising a set of rules, and thus
recursively subject to the same criticisms.
A response might be to try to end this quibbling
by implementing the rule you intend as a computer
program and saying that what you mean by the rule is
the computer code and what you mean by following
the rule is producing the same sequence as does the
computer when fed a natural number. However, the
same problems arise in a slightly different guise. Your
code implementation requires following a set of coding
rules, and we are once again left with having to clarify
what it means to follow those rules. Further, any actual
computer is, of course, a physical device subject to
design errors, manufacturing defects, and malfunctions
and the code in which you implement the algorithm
itself may contain errors.4
The central issue here is, as pointed out by
Wittgenstein, that following a rule cannot be something
purely privately understood. If this were not the case,
then there would be no distinction between my believing
I am following a rule and my following it. I could
not be mistaken about my rule following. Rather,
following any particular rule involves shared linguistic
understandings of the communities within which the
rule is embedded. For example, within a community
of basketball players, “shooting a free throw” involves
a set of rules or conventions specifying where to stand,
when to stand there, and so on. Learning these rules is
a part of what it takes to be fully part of a community
of basketball players. Importantly, this learning could
not be reduced to looking at a printed list of rules and
doing what they said. The doing what they said part
is precisely that which must be learned and may well
involve being coached and corrected as to what it means
to follow them in specific instances.
Within many linguistic communities, the sequence
0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, . . . has a standard interpretation and
being a participant in those communities involves
learning that interpretation. Understanding what is
meant by going on in the same way (. . .) does not
necessarily involve reducing . . . to something simpler.
Instead, we come to understand what is meant by
being shown many examples. We then demonstrate our
understanding by completing additional examples in the
presence of community members to see if they agree that
we are doing it right. That is, have we demonstrated that
we appear to be following the standard interpretation? A
critical point here is that the test of our understanding is
a public linguistic one and not our privately held belief.
4See [12,13] for a more complete discussion of why coding rules
on a computer does not solve the underlying issue.
Following rules leads to those rules becoming
embedded within our brain and, in the process, possibly
rewriting rules already there all in a manner fully
compatible with ECT and a materialist ontology. This
does not, however, mean that we will be aware of all
those rules. A ball is thrown to us and we raise our
arms and catch it. Could we articulate the rules learned
from infanthood that led to our accomplishing this rather
amazing feat?
Learning to follow rules requires engagement with a
language community. It is a process involving both rules
we are aware of (for example, do not steal) as well as
evaluation rules which may lurk beneath our immediate
cognition (for example, extreme cases where maybe it’s
okay to steal).
This notion of following rules by engaging with an
appropriate shared language community is extremely
relevant to the development of machine intelligence.
We illustrate this by reference to natural language AI
models. A popular approach for developing these
models involves taking domains of interest, collecting
lots of presumably relevant data and programming the
computer to look for patterns in those data in a largely
unsupervised manner. Specifically, predictive natural
language models of the sort we discuss take sentences or
other strings of text and, in varying ways try to leverage
the context of the text to predict what text will come
next.
For example, OpenAI’s predictive text natural
language processing (NLP) model was provided 5700
gigabytes of unlabeled text5 as data from which to
produce a neural network. The resultant model, GPT-3,
has 175 billion parameters [14] and is capable, with
very little training, of accomplishing tasks including
summarizing documents, generating recipes, and acting
as a chatbot. This is clearly rule governed behavior
though it did not result from learning via rule following
in the sense we have described it. Training only
minimally required examples (few-shot learning) and
did not involve ongoing engagement as a participant in
a language community.
Google Brain’s Switch-C NLP has up to a trillion
parameters [15] and was trained using the Colossal
Clean Crawled Corpus [16]. The text in this dataset
came from a 2019 snapshot of the Web filtered to
exclude such things as non-English text, non-sentences,
offensive words, and so on. Included then is text from
Wikipedia, major news sites, open-access publications,
etc. The vast majority of included text, 92%, is
estimated to have been written between 2011 and 2019
[16]. Switch-C was trained on tasks such as masking
5As mid-2021 the entire Wikipedia consists of a little under 20
gigabytes of (compressed) text.
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15% of the words in sentences and then learning to
predict the missing text and locating text to answer
questions. Importantly, Switch-C has the capacity to
determine which parameters to use for a given presented
example by routing incoming sample texts to a specific
‘expert’ layer in the network as computed on the fly
thus avoiding the computational and energy overhead of
invoking multiple, often unhelpful, expert layers. The
basic idea is that an AI model should not always have to
reference all of its components each time it is presented
a task. Of course, implementing such a notion is no
small job. As with GPT-3, while Switch-C’s behavior is
rule governed, its training did not involve ongoing active
engagement with a language community.6
Finally, we can look at what consequences this
all has for aligning human values with those in an
imaginable AI. Already we have autonomous vehicles
on the road and in the air. How can we be confident that
such systems comport well with human values? That is
that they follow human ethics and moral rules. We do
not want AIs eating our metaphorical daisies.
In his recent book, Brian Christian [18] takes up
the issue of risks associated with AI. He writes, “How
to prevent such a catastrophic divergence—how to
ensure that these models capture our norms and values,
understand what we mean or intend, and, above all,
do what we want—has emerged as one of the most
central and most urgent scientific questions in the field
of computer science. It has a name: the alignment
problem.” From an ethics perspective, we would like
to see AI and human entities operating from similar
or identical principles or, at least, knowing where we
disagree. Importantly, we would not want there to be
significant divergence between our human values and
those of an AI. Additionally, as human ethics and values
develop and change, we might want an AI to somehow
reflect those changes.
Alignment issues with AI large language models as
well as AI facial recognition programs have been well
documented. The now classic paper by Buolamwini and
Gebru [19] provide a detailed account of how sampling
bias in images used to build facial recognition programs
bleeds directly into ethically repugnant decisions being
made when such AI products are commercialized and
used in law enforcement [20]. Similar issues arise
with the large language models. Given how they are
constructed, the rules they learn reflect the text they use
to form those rules. “Biases can be encoded in ways
that form a continuum from subtle patterns like referring
6Learning to imitate text from a fixed body of text, however large,
is not, we contend, the same as generating sentences in contexts and
having others, and these others most certainly could be non-human
machines, query and correct your usage. Our distinction here is
captured well in [17]. More on this below.
to women doctors as if doctor itself entails not-woman
or referring to both genders excluding the possibility of
non-binary gender identities’, through directly contested
framings (e.g. undocumented immigrants vs. illegal
immigrants or illegals), to language that is widely
recognized to be derogatory (e.g. racial slurs) yet still
used by some” [17]. When insidious ethical and moral
rules and concepts are embedded in the corpus used in
developing a model, it should be no surprise that those
same rules are reflected in the AI model itself. Or
when images used to train a facial recognition system
do not adequately capture the full range and distribution
of actual faces in the worlds in which that system is later
deployed, it should be expected that the AI model may
produce ethically relevant misclassifications.
Our contention is that these sorts of ethical issues
cannot be remedied by simply doing better sampling. In
many cases, it is the reference population itself that is
of ethical consequence. Is the set of people convicted of
a crime in the U.S. an appropriate population to sample
from if we are interested in characteristics of criminals?
Or should we first acknowledge that the U.S. criminal
justice system itself has embedded normatively relevant
biases? How do we sample from alternative justice
systems and over what time period? As Nick Bostrom
argues, eliminating reference population bias is fraught
with difficulty and potential paradoxes [21].
There are several related senses of bias which merit
being distinguished here. The first is technical bias
resulting from poor sampling technique. This can occur,
for example, when a training set does not properly
represent the population from which it is drawn. A
second sense of bias we term fairness bias. This
form of bias can occur when either a training itself set
contains attributes that many might consider irrelevant
and inequitable. For example, suppose an AI trained
to assist in hiring decisions used, among other factors,
schools attended by previously successful applicants.
Such an AI would exhibit fairness bias if it turned out
that applicants attending the same schools as the CEO
had previously been favored. Similarly, if society as
whole has become organized in an unfair manner then
it should be expected that representative training data
from that population will bring along with it fairness
bias as seen in the language models discussed earlier.
What we are terming fairness bias is, we think, related to
Benjamin’s New Jim Code [22] in that fairness bias can
be deeply structural and, as such, is largely immune to
mediation via technical means such as better sampling.
This is extremely troubling for any AI that is built
solely using training data based on a snapshot of society.
Exposing fairness biases would seem to require the sort
of engaged deliberative reasoning associated with rule
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following.
From the perspective we have been developing in
this paper, there are additional issues which, we believe,
pose serious challenges to embedding ethics in an AI.
All AIs, as is the case with humans, are rule governed
in that their behaviors are compatible with physical
principles and ECT. Ethics rules, however, exemplify
a particular kind of rule in that learning and following
them requires ongoing engagement with a language
community in which those rules are maintained and
modified.
In other words, rules such as ethics rules are not
static; their evaluation and even structure can change
as a consequence of discussion among community
members. Though rules may be well understood
within a language community at any given point in
time, these understandings may change over time and
thus appear to an outsider as vague. This poses
challenges to attempts to encode the rules within an
AI. If the AI is not in ongoing interactive engagement
with that language community, its encoded ethics rules
may fall out of alignment. The kind of AI model
exemplified by GPT-3 and Switch-C would appear
incapable of interacting with a reference language
community for several reasons. First, as constructed,
their representation of language is largely based on
the past. They try to respond to a given problem
by interpreting it, even if it is presented in natural
language, in terms of rules based completely on past
usage. Further, a query of these systems as to why
they were using language the way they were would
involve looking at a huge number of parameter values,
loss functions and interconnections. We have an AI
parroting human language [17] but unable to participate
in deliberative reasoning with humans in that human
language. It is akin to trying to create a shared map
of a room with a bat [23]. Yet, as we have argued,
deliberative reasoning is at the core of moral and ethics
discourse.
Nothing we have said precludes developing an
AI capable of continuing engagement with a human
community using a largely shared human language.
Humans may have some rules inaccessible to them and
thus not open to deliberation and the AI may have rules
unintelligible to we humans. All that is required is that
deliberative reasoning be carried among humans and the
AI. It is not inconceivable that such a rule following AI
could be developed. However, now we run up against
a different set of problems. First, the AI could almost
certainly reason many orders of magnitude faster than
most, if not all, humans. Second, the AI itself could
be cloned at very low marginal cost. The result would
be that the AIs might quickly dominate community
discussions both in terms of number of participants and
the speed with which those participants reached ethical
conclusions. A consequence is that our shared language
would veer in the direction of what was computationally
efficient for the AIs and, indeed, ethics rules might
also shift to reflect the much faster reasoning of the
AIs. Once again ethics rule would move away from
alignment with human values.
3. Conclusion
With AI being embedded in many aspects of our
lives, warnings are being raised about implications
for furthering inequality or bias already existing in
society [19, 22, 24]. A widely shared concern, for
example, is that use of AI models will lead to
legal, financial, or health initiatives disproportionately
harmful to marginalized populations if these populations
are not properly represented in training datasets [19,
25, 26]. In this paper, we argue that addressing this
and other related issues requires rethinking beyond
the legitimate critiques regarding representation and
sampling. Specifically, we propose a framework
centered on rule following to examine fundamental
issues in ethics, AI alignment, and computational
models.
Our argument here is that though all AIs are rule
governed, only some can also be described as rule
following. A direct implication is that a snapshot of
an AI will not be sufficient to determine whether it is,
or has been, rule following as the distinction lies in
how it has developed over time in connection with its
external environment. For many AIs, this may be an
anthropomorphic distinction without a difference.
Requiring that AI systems, like human
beings, use language, possess concepts,
and reason—that is to say, follow rules
of meaning and grammar, categorization,
inference, and so on—looks like one more
example of anthropocentrism in AI. For if
the rhetoric of AI is disregarded, an AI
system’s (in practice) inability to follow
rules, use language, possess concepts, or
reason is an “irrelevant disability” (Turing’s
phrase)—as unimportant as the lack of a
face or mother [27].
However, as AIs move into areas involving decisions
with ethical implications we contend that our distinction
does matter as learning and acting with regard to
ethics and morality is simultaneously rule governed
and rule following. Much of what matters in politics,
for example, involves debate over what is the ‘right’
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thing to do. These debates are engaged within
language communities using phrases which themselves
can restrict or open up questions of ethics and morality.
Terms such as Asian American or woman doctor are not
simply descriptors but also focus attention on category
distinctions capable of carrying considerable moral
weight.
Norbert Weiner, an early theoretician in what has
become AI, clearly anticipated the concern expressed in
this paper when he wrote “the machine like the djinnee,
which can learn and can make decisions on the basis
of its learning, will in no way be obliged to make such
decisions as we should have made, or will be acceptable
to us. For the man who is not aware of this, to throw the
problem of his responsibility on the machine, whether it
can learn or not, is to cast his responsibility to the winds,
and to find it coming back seated on the whirlwind” [28].
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